Section : SEMINAIRE S2P 2018-2019 | Séminaire Politiques Publiques - S2P 2021-2022

Résumé de section

Mardi 13 novembre 2018, 17h-19h, salle 114
La dette et la monnaie – Les leçons de la crise des dettes souveraines en zone euro

Xavier Timbeau, OFCE

Discutant : Jean-Marc Daniel, ESCP

Mardi 20 novembre 2018, 17h-19h, salle 114

Bones, Bacteria and Break Points:The Heterogeneous Spatial Effects of the Black Death and Long-Run Growth

Noel Johnson, U. George Mason (en coll. avec Remi Jedwab et Mark Koyama)

Discutant : Hillel Rapoport, PSE

Abstract : The Black Death killed about 40% of Europe’s population between 1347-1352. Historical studies suggest that this mortality shock played a major role in shifting Europe onto a path to sustained economic growth. Using a novel dataset that provides information on spatial variation in plague mortality at the city level, as well as a range of controls and various identification strategies based on the spread of the epidemic, we explore the short-run and long-run impact of the Black Death on city growth. We find evidence for aggregate convergence. On average, cities recovered their pre-plague population within two centuries. However, there was considerable heterogeneity in the response to the shock, hence local divergence. The Black Death led to an urban reset: cities with better geographical and non-geographical endowments did relatively well, while other cities collapsed. In particular, our results emphasize the importance of trading networks in explaining urban recovery. Furthermore, the Black Death led to the creation of new cities in areas that were relatively less urbanized before it hit. Our analysis thus suggests that the Black Death may have permanently affected the spatial distribution and aggregate level of economic activity, potentially contributing to long-run growth in Europe.

Mardi 27 Novembre 2018, 17h-19h, salle 114

La réforme du financement de l’hôpital public

Lise Rochaix, Hospinnomics - PSE

Discutante : Sophie Massin, LEM, U. Artois, & CES

Mardi 04 décembre 2018, 17h-19h, salle 114

Le prix de la démocratie

Editions Fayard, 2018

Julia Cagé, Sciences Po Paris

Discutant : François Facchini, CES

Mardi 15 janvier 2019, 17h-19h, salle 114

Autour d’un salaire maximum ?

Philippe Askenazy, Centre Maurice Halbwachs (CNRS-EHESS-ENS)

Discussion introduite par Christine Ehrel (CNAM, Paris)

Mardi 29 janvier 2019, 17h-19h, salle 114

La crédibilité de la monnaie dans une économie monétaire de production

Jonathan Massonnet, Haute Ecole de Gestion, Genève (en coll. avec Sergio Rossi, U. Fribourg, et S. Virely, U. Bourgogne)

→ Abstract
Discussion introduite par Alfonso Giuliani (CES, Paris 1)

Mardi 05 février 2019, 17h-19h, salle 114

Warfare’s ecological footprint: A Synthetic Control (SCM) approach with data from the Falkland Islands (avec S. Panel)

Antoine Pietri (Ministère de la Défense) (en coll. avec S. Panel)

Discutant : Luigi Moretti (CES, Paris 1)

Warfare has been found to have detrimental impacts on biodiversity due to its long-lasting economic and social consequences. Yet, much less is known about the amount of biodiversity loss directly resulting from the use of military technology. This paper analyzes the environmental consequences of one of the largest aerial and naval conflict of the late 20st century, namely the 1982 Falklands War. The fact that the conflict was unrelated to environmental issues, did not spill over to neighboring countries, and did not relapse afterwards, allows us to circumvent identification issues that commonly affect comparative studies on the ecological footprint of warfare. As an indicator of the marine ecosystem status, we analyze population trends of king penguins breeding at the Falkland Islands and six other sub-Antarctic colonies over a thirty-year period (1965-1995). We use the Synthetic Control method – a method that was explicitly designed for small-N comparative studies – in order to build ``counterfactual'' Falkland Islands whose characteristics closely resemble those of the Falklands before the war and allows us to approximate the trends of the outcome variable in the absence of the war. We find tentative evidence that the war led to a short-term increase in king penguins’ population growth. However, this effect is offset by a higher rate of breeding failures during the war, resulting in a delayed adult population decrease. We find no evidence of lasting effects.

Mardi 12 février 2019, 17h-19h, salle 114

Les moteurs du développement territorial
André Torre, INRA
→ Télécharger l'article (RERU, oct 2018)

Discutantes :Dorine Cornet, CES & Mairie de Paris, et Patricia Vornetti, CES

Résumé : Cet article propose une analyse des deux moteurs du développement territorial : les processus de production et de gouvernance. Il examine leurs caractéristiques, leur fonctionnement et le rôle qu’ils jouent dans la mise en place des mécanismes de développement. Les modalités de création des innovations territoriales de différentes natures (technologiques, organisationnelles, sociales et institutionnelles) sont également étudiées. Le texte commence par un bilan de littérature et d’expériences sur les notions de gouvernance et de production au niveau territorial, suivi par une analyse de leurs modalités de fabrication des innovations territoriales. Pour finir, les mécanismes du développement territorial sont décrits sous forme de schémas, en s’appuyant sur trois options possibles : la loyauté ou la coopération, la prise de parole ou la concurrence, l’exit spatial ou la délocalisation.

Mardi 19 février 2019, 17h-19h, salle 114

Civic Engagement and State Provision of Public Goods: An Experiment

Abstract: Effective states solve the problem of financing the provision of public goods by mandating contributions in the form of taxes and imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, government might tax and provide public goods accountably only if enough citizens are civically engaged. We study the voluntary cooperative underpinnings of the accountable sanction-imposing state by conducting a two-level public goods experiment in which civic engagement can build a sanction scheme to solve the first order public goods dilemma. We find that when civic engagement costs are low relative to the benefits of public good provision, the overall dilemma problem is tractable, though it is never privately profitable to civically engage. In addition to a small average cost-to-benefit ratio, local social interaction among participants boosts cooperation.
Jean-Robert Tyran, U. Vienna

Discussion : Louis Levy-Garboua, CES UP1 & Béatrice Boulu Reshef CES UP1

Work motivation and Teams (en coll. avec Simone Haeckl et Rupert Sausgruber)
→ Télécharger le papier

Abstract : We provide a new measure of work motivation and show that motivation shapes the effects of team incentives and observation by peers on performance. In particular, we measure motivation to work hard as the deviation from the money-maximizing benchmark in a real-effort experiment. While we find that average output increases in response to team incentives and observation, we find that highly motivated workers do not respond. The reason is that highly motivated workers already work hard and increasing effort even further is very costly to them.

Mardi 26 février 2019, 17h-19h, salle 114

The Effects of Land Redistribution: Evidence from the French Revolution

Raphaël Franck, U. Jerusalem (en coll. avec Theresa Finley et Noel D. Johnson)

Mardi 19 mars 2019, 17h-19h, salle 114

Elections systems, the beauty premium in politics, and the beauty of dissent
Heinrich Ursprung (U. Konstanz, Germany) ( en coll. Niklas Potrafke)

We ask three questions. First do election systems differ in how they translate physical attractiveness of candidates into electoral success? Second, do political parties strategically exploite the "beauty premium" when deciding on which candidates to nominate and third do elected MPs use their beauty premium to reap some independance their party? Using the German election system that combines first past the post election with party list proportional representation our results show that plurality élections provide more scope for translating physical attractiveness into electoral success than proportional representation. Whether political parties strategically use the beauty premium to optimize their electoral objectives is less clear. Physically attractive MPs, however, allow thenselves to dissent more often, i.e. they vote more often against the party line than their less attractive peers.
→ Télécharger l'article

Mardi 26 mars 2019, 17h-19h, salle 114

Autour du livre

Moral disagreements in Business. An exploratory introduction

Marian Eabrasu, South Champagne Business School

Springer, sept 2018

Abstract: This book disassembles the moral assessment of business practices into its constituent parts to identify and clarify the four key concepts that form the basis of important moral disagreements in business: ‘personhood,’ ‘ownership,’ ‘harm,’ and ‘consent.’ ‘Moral bottom lines’ are those fundamental concepts in business ethics that ultimately account for our most resilient moral claims and unsurpassable convictions, and exploring them provides essential insights into the grounds on which we disagree in business ethics. This analysis is useful for students in business school looking to understand fundamental moral disagreements in business and for practitioners interested in connecting practice with their own moral intuitions. The book also challenges scholars of business ethics by arguing that we can reduce business ethics disagreements to these four issues.

La discussion sera introduite par Emmanuel Picavet, NoSoPhi, U. Paris 1

Mardi 16 avril 2019, 17h-19h, salle 116
The Politics of Experimentation: Political Competition and Randomized Controlled Trials
Michael T. Dorsch, Central European University. Budapest (co-auteurs : Cristina Corduneanu-Huci et Paul Maarek)
This paper provides an analysis of the political factors that might aﬀect the location of Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) experiments in public policy. We ﬁrst review some of the potential supply and demand-side channels of site selection, and then focus on the role of domestic political competition in determining when decision makers are interested in policy learning. We argue that more competitive political environments, where incumbents face a higher probability of losing power, strengthen the incentives of bureaucrats and politicians to run RCTs. We also introduce a unique data set on development RCTs that we have compiled. Over a cross-national panel and a panel of Indian states, we ﬁnd that RCTs testing accountability interventions or involving the government as a partner are more likely to occur in politically competitive jurisdictions. Other types of ﬁeld experiments are less sensitive to context. Results are statistically robust to estimation with instrumental variables, alternative speciﬁcations, and on larger datasets of development RCTs. We suggest that the political context matters for when, where, and with which partners policy RCTs happen.
La discussion sera introduite par Jean Cartier-Bresson, CEMOTEV, U. Versailles

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